


TOP SECRET

25X1



19 December 1961

25X1



Copy No. *ED-8*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



TOP SECRET

19 December 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. The situation in Goa. (*Page i*)
2. The Congo situation. (*Page iii*)




25X1

4. Pakistan-India: Ayub comments on Indian suggestion Kashmir settlement might be negotiated by adjusting cease-fire line. (*Page iv*)
5. Okinawa: Conservatives win Naha mayoralty by narrow margin. (*Page iv*)
6. Communist China: Threat of food shortages prompts new experiments in organization of agriculture. (*Page v*)
7. Sukarno calls for readiness to "liberate" West New Guinea but sets no date. (*Page vi*)

25X1





25X1

25X1

19 Dec 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map Page

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 December 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*Goa Situation: With the reported fall of the Goan capital of Panjim early this morning, the Indian army's thrust had cut Goa in two and broken the back of Portugal's outmanned and outgunned resistance. At 0300 EST, New Delhi began claiming total victory after 36 hours.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Council met in an urgent session late on the 18th, in response to a Portuguese appeal. Following the failure of a resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the UAR calling upon Portugal to "cooperate with India in liquidation of the colonial position" in the subcontinent, the USSR vetoed a Western-sponsored resolution calling upon India to agree to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of its troops.

Portugal's press and radio are reflecting the regime viewpoint that the reported loss of Goa is partly the responsibility of Lisbon's NATO partners, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, who failed to take a sufficiently vigorous position against Indian aggression. As a result, Lisbon appears to be reassessing its alliance system. A broadcast on the 18th, for example, included the statement that "we shall see how the Americans who used our bases in the Azores will excuse themselves." On

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the 15th, Foreign Minister Nogueira told Secretary Rusk that there would be a "possibility of a fundamental change in (Lisbon's) foreign policy" should Goa be lost. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

International reaction to the Indian move has followed fairly predictable lines. The Communists have supported the action while Western reaction has been uniformly critical. Sukarno, whose position regarding West Irian is analogous, has lent strong support to India's action, as have the Egyptians and the Afghans. A number of other neutrals have been less than enthusiastic about India's resort to force, while at the same time strongly critical of Portuguese colonialism. [redacted] (Map) [redacted]

25X1


25X1

19 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1



19 Dec 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map Page

*Congo: Tshombé, who arrived in Northern Rhodesia on 18 December, is expected to reach Kitona base near Leopoldville on 19 December for talks with Adoula. Prospects for an early accommodation, however, are poor. UN officials in Leopoldville regard Adoula's initial terms--which include a demand for Tshombé's resignation as provincial premier--as "stiffer than expected." Tshombé, on his part, continues to profess confidence concerning the fighting in Elisabethville, and may not meet with Adoula unless the UN carries out its commitment to permit a suspension of hostilities during the negotiations.

25X1

UN forces in Elisabethville, although in control of most of the city, continue to meet with pockets of Katangan resistance. Tshombé's residence and the Union Minière smelter--both on the western side of the city--reportedly are in Katangan hands. Tshombé's forces appear disorganized, however, and probably number no more than 1,600 in the city proper.

25X1

Ethiopian troops have engaged in thievery, wanton destruction, and attacks on civilians during the UN operation. Such depredations, together with instances of looting by anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen from the nearby refugee camp, appear to have heightened apprehension among Europeans still in Elisabethville.

25X1

Adoula is confronted with serious dissension from within his government, and may face a cabinet crisis regardless of the outcome of his talks with Tshombé. Interior Minister Gbenye--who until recently served as a rallying point for leftist elements loyal to Adoula--appears to have broken with Adoula in a dispute over control of internal security.

25X1

25X1

19 Dec 61


DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

25X1




25X1

Pakistan-India: President Ayub, on being told by Ambassador Galbraith that Nehru may be willing to settle the Kashmir dispute by making minor adjustments on the present cease-fire line, replied that Pakistani control over certain limited areas now held by India could provide the basis for a settlement. Ambassador Roundtree believes, in view of US interest in encouraging negotiations on Kashmir, that Pakistan now will be less inclined to press the dispute in the United Nations. Such negotiations could possibly be held after Indian elections in February. The Pakistani Government, however, is using developments in Goa as an excuse to step up its propaganda against India in the Kashmir dispute, which may inhibit any Indian readiness to negotiate.

25X1

25X1



25X1

Okinawa: The conservative victory in the Naha mayoral election on 17 December completes the Okinawa Liberal-Democratic party's (OLDP) control of the major elective offices in the Ryukyu Islands and increases the likelihood that

19 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

25X1

the movement for reversion of the islands to Japan will be conducted within moderate bounds. The election of Junji Nishime over his leftist rival, by the narrow margin of 738 votes among the 90,000 cast, may have been made possible by the OLDP's abandonment just before the election of its "gradualist" approach to reversion and the adoption of a more aggressive platform calling for "the constructive promotion of the return of administrative authority to Japan."

The defeat of incumbent mayor Saichi Kaneshi, who ran third on the strength of local issues and his good record as mayor, suggests also that the Okinawan electorate may have an expanded interest in the reversion question. At the same time, since the vote does not lend itself to interpretation as a strong protest against US policies in the Ryukyus, it should reduce the capability of Japanese leftists to generate pressure on the government to seek expanded participation in Ryukyuan affairs.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Communist China: Under the threat of another winter of severe food shortages, the Chinese Communists are continuing to experiment with new forms of rural organization in an attempt to revive incentives lost under the radical commune program. The "contract" system tried out earlier this year, which gave the production teams a voice in setting production quotas and allowed them to retain any excess over the quota, has reportedly broken down in some Kwangtung communes because of a poor late harvest. Many teams failed to reach their quota. Plans for a new "self-supporting" farm system have been proposed in some Kwangtung communes to take effect during spring planting in 1962. Under this new system production sub-teams would rent rice paddies from the production team, supply their own seed, tools, animals, manpower, and fertilizer, and keep all the produce after paying a land tax in the form of grain. Rationing would be abolished for the units

19 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

[redacted] using this new system, so that farmers would have to rely on their own crops whether harvests were successful or not. While reportedly pleased that the authorities were acknowledging the need for stronger incentives, the peasants were still apprehensive over the as yet undetermined level of taxes, which they feel could mean starvation rations if there were another poor crop. [redacted]

25X1

25X1 *Indonesia: Sukarno, in a speech before a mass rally in Jogjakarta on 19 December, issued a call to the Indonesian people to "be prepared for a general mobilization" for an assertion of Indonesia's sovereignty over West New Guinea. The speech, delivered in demagogic style, as expected sets no specific date for the "liberation" of West New Guinea but represents a significant further step in Sukarno's conditioning of the Indonesian public--and a warning to the world at large--of his intent to achieve control of the Dutch territory by a military adventure if necessary. Sukarno's self-styled "people's command" also included instructions to "hoist the (Indonesian) flag" in the disputed territory and to "frustrate the organization of the Papua puppet state by the Dutch colonialists"--the latter a reference to recent Dutch efforts to provide the rudiments of self-rule for the indigenous peoples of West New Guinea.

25X1

[redacted] There is ample evidence of Indonesia's efforts to prepare for aggressive action in the event that its political efforts to gain control of West New Guinea--without which, it asserts, its independence is not complete--are unavailing. The latest indication is an announcement by the Indonesian Air Minister, apparently issued concurrently with Sukarno's speech, of a new Air Force command for the districts of the Molucca Islands and West Irian, and an order to close all airspace over this area in the shortest possible time. Despite protests of unpreparedness on the part of some of Indonesia's military chiefs, there is general agreement

19 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

25X1

[redacted] among qualified observers that if Sukarno ordered a move against the territory he would be obeyed. Sukarno's latest pronouncement is in effect an ultimatum: that Indonesia intends to take aggressive action if it is not given a satisfactory political settlement by the Dutch. Current military action against Portuguese possessions in India--a move heartily endorsed by Indonesia--will probably provide further encouragement to Sukarno for a move of his own. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

19 Dec 61

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET